How hateful rhetoric connects to real-world violence |
- Making pre-K work: Lessons from the Tennessee study
- Governments across Africa are rebuilding home-grown school feeding (HGSF) programs to help their recovery from the pandemic
- Developing economies face a rough ride as global interest rates rise
- Erdoğan’s straits of indecision in the Russia-Ukraine war
| Making pre-K work: Lessons from the Tennessee study Posted: 28 Feb 2022 02:58 PM PST By Kathy Hirsh-Pasek, Dale C. Farran, Margaret Burchinal, Kimberly Nesbitt The recent evaluation of the Tennessee pre-K program by Kelley Durkin and colleagues found that by the end of sixth grade, children who attended the public statewide pre-K program in Tennessee actually did worse on academic and behavioral outcomes than those who had not attended pre-K. Other less rigorous, quasi-experimental longitudinal studies showed substantial gains in skills, especially basic reading and math during pre-K, but also found that those gains partially or completely diminished during kindergarten relative to skills attained by children who did not attend pre-K. This finding—called either "fade out" or "catch up"—is surprising given that pre-K teachers now spend more time teaching literacy skills than any other subject. In the aggregate, these studies raise many questions about how to best design early education to secure a strong return on investment. Durkin and colleagues end with this prescient conclusion in their evaluation:
Unpacking these arguments, it is critical to consider what counts as a quality classroom in pre-K. The Tennessee pre-K classrooms met the structural quality characteristics (for example, number of students in the class and teacher's level of education). Yet, many studies of pre-K classroom observations report that the learning experiences are predominantly marked by large group activities with passive children learning in teacher-led instruction. Evaluation of the North Carolina pre-K program found that time spent in large group activities was the largest negative predictor of gains in important skills such as language, math, and executive functioning. That is, more time in large group activities is counterproductive to strong outcomes. In fact, this type of teaching might actually rob children of agency and hence from the types of learning experiences related to long-term school success. The extant research strongly suggests that young children learn best (indeed all of us do) when the learning is active, engaging, meaningful, iterative, socially interactive, and joyful—when it is playful. At least one state, New Hampshire, is using the latest data to legislate that all kindergarten programs be play-based. By extension, pre-K classrooms should also adopt a playful learning approach to align practices with how children learn best. The second lesson brought forward by the Tennessee study concerns the outcomes currently used to judge the effectiveness of pre-K programs. This issue concerns what children should learn. The basic skills of reading and mathematics are mastered quickly, even by children who do not attend pre-K, thus accounting for the now well-established pre-K "fade out" or "catch-up" effects. Contrary to the assertions of some, science does not suggest that early skills learning begets later skills learning—not when they are basic skills in reading and math such as rote decoding, phonemic awareness, and counting skills. For example, David Grissmer demonstrated that "Together, attention, fine motor skills, and general knowledge are much stronger overall predictors of later math, reading, and science scores than early math and reading scores alone." Indeed, studies find that early language or executive functioning skills at age four, but not early reading and math skills, positively predicted the rate of learning in grade school. Finally, a study in New Zealand demonstrated that by age 10, early and late readers were indistinguishable from one another. Together, these and a host of other studies of early learning strongly suggest that the teaching of targeted basic skills in the early years is unwarranted and will not facilitate the development of those more foundational skills of attention, social development, working memory, and persistence.
Well-curated classrooms that encourage reading, telling stories, and asking questions support language and literacy growth, and playing with blocks, measurement activities, and puzzles, among many other games prepares children for STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) learning. The Tennessee outcomes shined a light on the ways in which we are failing our youngest children by trying to hurry their childhood. Without educational investment in a suite of skills that include collaboration (building relationships), communication (language), content (reading, math, and approaches to learning), critical thinking, creative innovation (curiosity and exploration), and confidence (learning from failure and perseverance)—the 6Cs—young children will not be prepared for formal school. Children who learn these foundational 6C skills will also be better prepared for learning later in life. This suggests that a well-curated classroom in which students are exposed to books, blocks, and puzzles and in which guided play is supported will best lead to successful outcomes. Importantly, a custodial environment in which free play is the only pedagogy will not support strong outcomes for children. We need to move away from pre-K (as a grade below kindergarten) and back to preschool, meaning the experiences that will benefit children before they attend formal school. We know how to do that, and when we put the appropriate curricula and pedagogy in place, children will thrive. This may even mean revisiting where preschool programs are housed. Perhaps if we move preschool out of departments of education, we will adopt more age-appropriate expectations and practices. Such a move will not only support foundations for learning but will have the additional benefit of helping working parents who gain from high-quality environments for their children and from a calendar that is not restricted to a formal school program.
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| Posted: 28 Feb 2022 02:48 PM PST By Boitshepo Bibi Giyose, Carmen Burbano de Lara, Donald A.P. Bundy Africa's efforts to feed its school children have been put at risk by the COVID-19 pandemicAt the beginning of 2020, national school feeding programs were delivering school meals to more children than at any time in human history, making school feeding the most extensive social safety net and the largest multidisciplinary and inter-sectoral program in the world. In fact, more than 65 million children received school meals across Africa in 2019, a massive increase from 38.4 million in 2013, according to the latest edition of the African Union Biannual Report on School Feeding in Africa. This success followed more than a decade of sustained growth in such programs, which had begun in Africa in 2003 with the adoption by New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of the home-grown school feeding (HGSF) approach of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) and the Malabo Commitments. The HGSF approach was selected by these agencies because it benefits both children and the farming community: It sources food locally which, with appropriate program design and implementation, can help ensure that food is fresh, nutritious, and culturally appropriate, while at the same providing a stable and predictable market for local small farmers, the majority of whom are women. However, by mid-2020, when schools closed worldwide to limit the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 388 million children reached by national programs had fallen by 370 million, such that nearly all the children who had previously benefited from these programs were suddenly deprived of, what had been for many of the most needy children, their one guaranteed nutritious daily meal. African governments co-create a global coalition to restore school meals by 2023Among other pressing issues, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of school meals in bringing vulnerable children—particularly girls—back into school as well as securing the economic future of their societies. In early 2021, the African Union (AU) called for the creation of a coalition focused on this vision, and this call was the impetus for governments to launch the School Meals Coalition at the United Nations Food Systems Summit in September 2021. The School Meals Coalition aims to restore school meals to 370 million children worldwide by 2023, and, by the end of the decade, reach an additional 73 million children—over 62 million of whom live on the African continent. African governments presented an Africa Position to the Food Systems Summit, and specifically recognized HGSF school meals programs as key game changers that bring children to school, especially girls, and enhance learning, while at the same time stimulating local agricultural markets. To turn ideas into meaningful action, global leaders collectively requested research support to ensure that policymakers and program leaders have access to independent evidence to guide the design, development, and implementation of these school-based programs. Putting research and evidence at the heart of policymakingFifty-nine countries—of which 27 are in Africa—now back the vision of the Coalition, many with specific endorsements from their heads of state. As part of this effort, their first initiative was to establish a Research Consortium for School Health and Nutrition, with a 10-year research agenda specifically intended to oversee research that policymakers need to power up their national school meal programs and ensure their quality, effectiveness, and efficiency. The heads of five U.N. Agencies (WFP, FAO, WHO, UNICEF, and UNESCO) have endorsed cross-sectoral approaches to strengthen school-based health interventions as part of the response for countries to build back better. Africa is leading the wayAlready, African countries are making specific commitments to strengthen their HGSF programs as part of the School Meals Coalition:
The African Union, and in particular the AU Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD), has spearheaded the concept of HGSF, recognizing that linking local farmers and communities with schools is an economically viable and potentially nutrition-friendly approach to strengthen the agriculture sector in Africa. The African Union is publishing their updated guidelines on HGSF on March 1 in honor of Africa Day of School Feeding. Importantly, the African Union has designated 2022 the "Year of Nutrition," with a view toward strengthening agricultural food systems to accelerate human, social, and economic capital development, and to accelerate the achievement of the Malabo targets by 2025, the Decade of Action on Nutrition by 2025, and the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. To make sure these programs are properly monitored and evaluated, the 2021 data from the first AU regional report on HGSF will serve to kick-start the School Meals Coalition Data and Monitoring Initiative, the latest product of the Coalition and the world's first systematic school health and nutrition database. Arguably, these collective actions to advance home-grown school feeding are the largest programmatic response to the pandemic in Africa, outside of the vaccination efforts. They have sprung out of the African Union's commitment to the School Meals Coalition and signal the region's collective support for the development of the next generation. The AU is now part of a Data and Monitoring Initiative of the School Meals Coalition, led by the World Food Program, that will serve to track progress across the continent as governments build back from the pandemic. More than 60 stakeholders—including U.N. agencies, development partners and non-state actors—have committed to support these government-led efforts. It is vital that this support materializes, and the children of Africa have a real chance to recover and catch up, and do not become long-term victims of the COVID-19 pandemic. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
| Developing economies face a rough ride as global interest rates rise Posted: 28 Feb 2022 01:32 PM PST By Indermit Gill Inflation has defied expectations everywhere. Half of all inflation-targeting central banks in developing economies now face inflation rates above their target range. Economic growth is slowing in low- and middle-income economies. And a cycle of monetary-policy tightening has begun that already is unlike any in recent memory. A month from now, the U.S. central bank is expected to raise interest rates, and investors are bracing for a big increase—the largest in more than 20 years. That prospect poses dangers for developing economies. U.S. policy rates—particularly the size of the changes and the degree to which they surprise markets—tend to be a reliable predictor of crises in developing economies. Currency, banking, and debt crises usually have important domestic causes here. Nevertheless, since the 1970s they have been much more likely to occur when the Federal Reserve is in the process of raising interest rates (Figure 1).
Developing economies still have time to protect themselves: For all the drama in markets lately, financial conditions remain relatively favorable for them. Yields on the 10-year U.S. Treasury bills—the most important indicator—have surged over the past few months but remain well below levels that preceded the global financial crisis in 2009. The same is true for 10-year German bunds. Policymakers would be wise to use the opportunity to put in defensive measures as quickly as possible. Specifically:
These measures should be calibrated, of course. Some countries face high financial and economic risks, the result of high debt and refinancing risks, slowing growth, and limited fiscal and monetary policy space. They should start with preemptive measures: Among other things, establish a crisis-response committee, reduce rollover risks by conducting liability-management exercises, and prearrange precautionary credit lines. Other countries face mainly economic risks, owing in part to a combination of high debt and a close link between the local currency and the U.S. dollar. They, among other things, should bolster their currency-management tools so they can lower foreign-exchange volatility. In the medium term, they should also move to reduce debt and alleviate structural fiscal deficits. A third set of countries faces mainly financial risks resulting from an abrupt change in investors' appetite for risk. Such a shift reduces flows of foreign capital and diminish liquidity in local financial markets. For them, ensuring financial-sector liquidity and stability should be high on the agenda. They should also take steps to reduce their reliance on foreign portfolio flows while strengthening domestic insolvency frameworks. Finally, some countries are in a relatively fortunate position: They are at low risk, mainly because they are not active borrowers in international markets and do not have much debt that needs to be refinanced. This includes many low-income countries. For these countries, the main task will be to maintain liquidity in the banking sector. Increasing local bond issuance can help. The world is coming off an extraordinary era of success in monetary policy—a time when inflation dropped to exceptional lows, along with interest rates, in most parts of the world, a time when economic growth yielded shared prosperity to a degree rarely seen in the past. It's not preordained that the shift to a more conventional policy environment of higher inflation and positive real interest rates must result in crisis. But the time to act—to prevent a preventable crisis—is now.
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| Erdoğan’s straits of indecision in the Russia-Ukraine war Posted: 28 Feb 2022 12:39 PM PST By Kemal Kirişci Over the weekend, Ukraine has succeeded in stalling Russia's onslaught, publics across the world have rallied behind Ukraine, and trans-Atlantic allies have taken their response to Russian aggression to a whole new level. These developments have forced Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — who, ahead of Friday's NATO meeting to discuss the Russian invasion, had criticized his allies as being all talk and no action — to end his own inaction on Ukraine's Thursday request for Ankara to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and with them access to the Black Sea, to Russian warships per the 1936 Montreux Convention. The Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, on Sunday announced that what was unfolding in Ukraine was indeed a "war," effectively closing the straits to the warships of belligerents. Erdoğan on Monday gave his implicit blessing to the decision by declaring how Turkey intends to continue to implement the convention in a manner to prevent crisis escalation, underlining that Turkey desires peace in the region. He expressed disappointment that Turkey's offers of mediation/arbitration did not bear fruit and that Turkey does not wish to give up good relations with both countries. The decision was partly prompted by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's tweet on Saturday thanking Turkey for closing the straits and partly by the necessity of not being left behind. Zelenskyy deliberately put Erdoğan in the spotlight to break the Turkish president's indecision. Nevertheless, Erdoğan's dilemma of choosing between Ukraine and Russia in the conflict has not been resolved. Furthermore, he faces a greater and more fundamental dilemma of whether he will persist with his anti-Westernism, including cozying up to Russia, or take a bold strategic step and return Turkey to its traditional Western vocation. What Zelenskyy sought from ErdoğanThe Montreux Convention has regulated merchant and military maritime traffic into and out of the Black Sea for 85 years. It lays down a set of provisions to regulate the passage of warships through the straits. These provisions govern the mode of entry, duration of stay, and tonnage, as well as the nature of weapons (main gun calibers, to be precise) they can carry on board. Their application varies depending on whether a passage occurs in peace or wartime or when there is a threat of war. Although the agreement generally favors Black Sea littoral states (Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia) over others in terms of transit of warships through the straits, certain restrictions apply universally without regard to a littoral-non-littoral distinction. Zelenskyy's call concerned Article 19 of the convention which requires Turkey in time of war to close the straits to the passage of warships from the belligerent states. Turkey has also the option to invoke Article 21 if Turkey considers itself to be threatened with "imminent danger of war." Then "the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government." However, in both cases there are exceptions which would allow warships belonging to "belligerent Powers" to return to their home bases from outside the Black Sea. Turkey could have possibly argued that what is unfolding in Ukraine is not a war especially given that Moscow has not officially declared war on Ukraine. However, given the blatant nature of Russia's aggression, so transparently revealed through social media, such a position would have been embarrassingly lacking in credibility. It would have also opened a Pandora's box concerning the future of the Montreux Convention. The convention's implementation was never perfect, but the fact that, so far, there has been no attempt to revise it and the international community has continued to abide by its terms speak volumes. The credit for this primarily went to Turkey's long-standing tradition of scrupulously overseeing the implementation of its terms. This could have changed, and triggered demands for revisions, a longtime nightmare of Turkey. Moreover, the decision to close the straits to the warships of the belligerents is unlikely to alter the military situation in the Black Sea. Russia's Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea, is formidable; Moscow had already completed its naval buildup, and Ukraine's navy is very limited. The real impact of the Turkish decision will be felt if the conflict turns into a war of attrition for Russia. Erdoğan's reasons for caution and new dilemmasThe Turkish economy is in its worst state since a long time, marked by galloping inflation and a growing current accounts deficit. Both Russia and Ukraine are economically dear to Turkey. 78% of Turkey's grain imports come from the two countries (64.6% from Russia and 13.4% from Ukraine). At a time when Western tourists are staying away, Russian and Ukrainian ones have constituted an important source of income for a sector that accounts for around 4% of the Turkish GDP. Both countries are important markets for Turkish exports as well as construction services. Finally, Turkey has important defense projects with both. Indeed, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones have been a valuable asset for Ukraine in the early days of the war. However, in terms of dependence, the balance has favored Russia. Firstly, on energy Turkey depends heavily on Russia. It is the second largest importer of Russian natural gas after Germany and Russia has been constructing a nuclear energy station that would supply 30% of Turkey's energy needs by 2030. Secondly, Turkey has relied on Russian acquiescence in northern Syria to deter the Assad regimes from mounting an offensive that risks displacing large numbers of displaced Syrians into Turkey at a time when public discontent against Syrian refugees is peaking (see slide 95 here). Furthermore, there is also the legacy of the pain that Russian President Vladimir Putin inflicted on Turkey after a Russian fighter plane was shot down by Turkey in November 2015 and the way Putin extracted an apology from Erdoğan himself. Undoubtedly, these considerations would have weighed heavily in Erdoğan's initial inaction and choice to play for time not to upset Putin. It may still be too early to predict the course of events in the immediate future, but it is increasingly looking like Putin's strategy has failed, and Ukrainians at large have stood their ground long enough for most of the world to rally behind them. More importantly, Putin inadvertently has helped trans-Atlantic allies to unite and finally confront him with truly harsh sanctions as well as supply significant lethal weapons to Ukraine. Furthermore, this past weekend also revealed the weakness of Putin's governance system in the face of a country led by a democratically-elected president fighting to join the Western world. Beyond the pressure that the crisis is putting on energy prices, Western sanctions — especially the decision to restrict Russian banks' access to SWIFT — will adversely impact the Turkish economy. The fragile Turkish currency lost 5% of its value just on the news of the Russian invasion. News of a barrage of tourism cancellations destroying expectations of a post-COVID-19 boom is going to exacerbate this fragility. These developments leave Erdoğan facing a new dilemma: to persist with his current policies or return Turkey to its traditional Western strategic orientation. The decision to implement Article 19 of the Montreux Convention was a significant step in the right direction but more should follow. Three suggestions: cease the incessant anti-Western rhetoric, abandon justifying the construction of the massive Canal Istanbul project as allowing Turkey to circumvent the Montreux Convention, and scrap the Russian S-400 missile systems that have so badly damaged the standing of Turkey in the trans-Atlantic alliance and increased Turkey's dependence on Russia. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
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