How hateful rhetoric connects to real-world violence |
- Resistance to Erdoğan’s encroachment at Turkey’s top university, one year on
- Steps the states should take to achieve the infrastructure bill’s broadband goals
- Did the FAA cry wolf on 5G?
- Zambia’s success will be Africa’s success
- The digital transformation of agriculture in Indonesia
- 4 paradoxes of global education on International Day of Education
- Federal investments ignore crucial upgrades to school facilities—and students pay the price
- Join the conversation on the top priorities for Africa in 2022
- How Middle Eastern conflicts are playing out on social media
- Japan-Taiwan relations: A look back on 2021 and look ahead to 2022
| Resistance to Erdoğan’s encroachment at Turkey’s top university, one year on Posted: 21 Jan 2022 01:54 PM PST By Kemal Kirişci, Mine Eder, Mert Arslanalp The start of 2021 was shocking as mobs attacked the U.S. Capitol, the bastion of American democracy, in an attempt to stop the certification of the presidential election. Simultaneously and far from the United States, a less conspicuous onslaught on another bastion of liberal democratic values unfolded when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arbitrarily appointed a hand-picked rector to run Istanbul's Boğaziçi University. Since then, Boğaziçi faculty, students, and alumni — including the authors of this piece — and supporters from the broader public have been protesting and resisting this decision, employing a range of innovative methods. Erdoğan has not yielded but he has not been able to impose his will on the university and bring it under his ever-growing one-man rule. The experience accumulated at Boğaziçi in the past year demonstrates how against all odds, persistence and resilience motivated by liberal democratic practices can still energize solidarities to resist arbitrary rule. It offers lessons for those who struggle to defend freedoms and resist authoritarian rule around the world. What happened and whyIn an overnight presidential decree on the first day of 2021, Erdoğan appointed Professor Melih Bulu as Boğaziçi's rector. None of the faculty members at the university were consulted in the selection of the new rector. Bulu's name was put forward by a committee of the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) that did not include a single member from Boğaziçi's faculty and did not seem deterred by his weak resume or suspect academic credentials marked by allegations of plagiarism. His only qualification was his close affiliation with the Turkish president and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). As such, Bulu joined the ranks of an overwhelming share of rectors at Turkish universities that have followed a similar career path, centered on loyalty rather than meritocracy and consensus building. The decision did not come as a surprise considering that Boğaziçi has traditionally represented Turkey's Western orientation, seeking to educate young minds attuned to democratic principles and capable of critical thinking. Classes are taught entirely in English. As a public university, it provides tuition-free education to a diverse body of students from all corners of the country, selected on merit alone. Any high school graduate, irrespective of religion, economic, or social background, can become a student at Boğaziçi if they receive the highest scores on a grueling national entrance exam taken by close to 2.5 million young people every year. These qualities do not dovetail with Erdoğan's vow to raise loyal and uncritical "devout generations." Founded in 1863 as Robert College, the school was eventually incorporated into the Turkish higher education network and renamed Boğaziçi in 1971, for its location on a hill overlooking the Bosporus Strait. Boğaziçi became home to students holding diverse political views during a difficult period in the country's history and stood out for its ability to provide an atmosphere where a culture of tolerance in support of diversity reigned. The tradition of tolerance persisted and manifested itself when the university resisted compliance with the headscarf ban imposed in the late 1990s, upholding the primacy of the right to education. A rector at the time worked with his colleagues to institute the practice of academic institutions electing their own presidents and rectors while valuing "horizontal, transparent, and inclusive" policymaking on campus, decisionmaking practices at odds with the heavily centralized, hierarchical, and opaque presidential system of governance Erdoğan imposed on Turkey in 2017. A menu of democratic protest and resistanceThe most visible face of protest is a daily gathering in front of the rectorate building, maintained by academics, students, and visiting alumni who turn their backs to the building and hold small placards with the slogans "We do not accept, we do not give up." The practice, held in all weather conditions without disrupting teaching and regular academic life on campus, acquired widespread public recognition and popularity through social media against all efforts of the government-controlled media to ignore or denigrate the protests. According to a January 2021 public opinion poll, 73% of respondents supported the statement that "university teaching staff should choose their own rector" and more than 50% of AKP supporters did not approve of politically-affiliated appointments for such positions. There was, however, limited solidarity shown by other universities due to control exerted by Erdoğan-appointed rectors and earlier purges of critically- and independently-minded academics. No doubt the way the Gezi Park protests of a decade ago — where passive resistance was also deployed by protestors — were crushed and then criminalized by the government-dampened expressions of overt solidarity. A much less visible method of resistance has been for academics to scrupulously demand the application of the university's bylaws and resist the rector's efforts to circumvent them. A case in point, for example, is demanding high academic standards and proper due process in the appointment of faculty to new schools and institutes imposed on the university by additional presidential decrees. Academics have also resorted to opening court cases to challenge these decrees as well as decisions by the Rector's Office, such as: the dismissals of faculty members and closing courses or changing course schedules thereby eliminating the autonomy of the departments and faculties; violating procedural rules in the university senate and executive board meetings; and firing high-level administrators and making irregular appointments to fill their posts, most recently sacking deans on false accusations. Currently, there are more than 20 such court cases. Another practice was to revive the practice of faculty electing their preferred candidate for rectorship. The opportunity arose in July 2021 when President Erdoğan, with a simple stroke of the pen, sacked Bulu, the very person he had appointed as a rector. In a smart move, Boğaziçi faculty, relying on the experience of having organized seven past elections, organized a symbolic "no-confidence vote" that included on the ballot the names of the two vice rectors under Bulu likely to be considered for appointment by Erdoğan. 746 Boğaziçi academics (including part-time and retired faculty) participated in the virtually-held vote. Those two received a no-confidence vote of more than 90% while 17 other candidates all received a vote of confidence. Not surprisingly, Erdoğan ignored the will of Boğaziçi academics and proceeded to appoint one of the two, Naci Inci, as the new rector, once more demonstrating his authoritarian priorities. Students and alumni have also been active. The former engaged in a rich repertoire of nonviolent protest during the course of 2021, ranging from singing slogans such as "we do not want a trustee rector" and circulating videos on social media to disarm misinformation in government-controlled media depicting Boğaziçi University as a bastion of pro-Western elitism. However, it is police violence against students exercising their constitutional right to protest and the locking of the campus gates with handcuffs that left the government in a very awkward situation in the court of public opinion, which wondered about the wisdom of an Erdoğan-appointed rector allowing this to unfold against the country's best and brightest students. The imprisonment of two protesting students for more than 90 days for jumping on the hood of the rector's car coincided with broader government practice of instrumentalizing criminalization to silence opposition and protesters. A public campaign organized by students, alumni, and faculty led to their release earlier this month. Alumni have also supported students whose scholarships were revoked, provided legal assistance, and raised awareness about Boğazici University's struggle for academic freedom in social and alternative media. Part of a universal struggle for democracyThat these forms of protest to defend academic autonomy are happening in a country marked by diminished media freedoms, severely weakened judicial independence, and an increasingly repressive environment — Turkey is at the top of the list of countries experiencing the sharpest declines in freedoms over the last decade — is no small achievement. It demonstrates how it is indeed possible to develop democratic forms of resistance to authoritarian and arbitrary rule under the most adverse conditions, as well as how in situations where institutional checks and balances are undermined by the executive it is possible to mobilize a coalition of pro-democracy forces. Only time will tell whether Boğazici's protests and resistance will survive Erdoğan's increasingly authoritarian rule and help open the way for broader peaceful opposition in the future — especially if Erdoğan choses to disrupt upcoming national elections. Still, the experience of Boğazici University should be seen as an inspiring example of the broader struggle in support of democratic values and freedoms across the globe. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
| Steps the states should take to achieve the infrastructure bill’s broadband goals Posted: 21 Jan 2022 10:22 AM PST By Blair Levin The recently signed Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) makes the largest federal investment into broadband expansion in the nation's history. To accomplish the act's broadband goals, Congress made states the key decisionmakers, with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) providing oversight. This piece lays out nine actions every state should take in the development and implementation of its broadband plan to achieve Congress' goal of universal connectivity. Publicly establish a vision for using broadband to improve residents' livesAs an initial action, states' political leadership should publicly establish broad—but clearly measurable and time-defined—goals to guide the broadband expansion process and build support for the effort. This starts with framing the problem and the opportunity, as well as raising aspirations from incremental progress on a limited budget to transformative long-term outcomes from federal investment. The vision should clarify that the goal is to not simply narrow the broadband network access gap, but close it permanently; to establish long-term approaches for managing the overall digital divide, including improving adoption and utilization for essential services; to generate long-term impacts on economic development and societal health; and to assign responsibilities to specific actors in the state administrative bureaucracy and hold them accountable for explicit results. In addition to setting general goals, the vision should include specific goals related to key underserved regions and population groups in the state. Build institutional capacity to achieve the plan's goalsMost of the IIJA dollars will flow to well-established state agencies with long histories of receiving and spending federal funds. However, unlike federal grants for roads, water, sewage, and other traditional infrastructure, there are limited state administrative resources and little historic precedent for distributing broadband funds. Building the capacity to do so requires a surge of short-term resources without overcommitting to long-term administrative capacity. There needs to be a clear identification of who will make decisions, interact with federal authorities, and represent the state with other stakeholders. A critical aspect will be to quickly learn from what other states have done or are doing. No states will have the time or resources to reinvent the wheel; in terms of institutional capacity, a study published last month found less than 50% of states are in a position to administer federal broadband grants now, even though funding is already starting to flow. With a significant number of similar tasks, states should seek to constantly upgrade their efforts by following the best practices of others. Develop and publish a comprehensive timelineThe NTIA broadband program will have numerous deadlines that states cannot afford to miss. And there are other federal programs that provide funding for broadband deployment and adoption efforts. Considering the multifaceted and complicated set of requirements and opportunities, states should create a comprehensive timetable so that all stakeholders are aware of critical deadlines, analysis is completed to provide decisionmakers with the necessary information, and applications are completed on a timely basis. Engage communities and stakeholders in development of the planStates should gather input from all relevant stakeholders to enable inclusive and responsive decisionmaking and achieve optimal political buy-in for the plan. This involves convening multiple interests, including local governments, internet service providers, educational institutions, health care providers, and the nonprofit sector, among others. This is not just a political courtesy. Congress took authority for broadband expansion planning away from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and gave it to the states, in part, so that decisions would better reflect local concerns. At the same time, the IIJA explicitly requires states to collaborate with regional and local governments to develop the state plan. In engaging with local stakeholders, states should do more than simply meet the 30-day public comment requirement in the bill. Successful implementation will require buy-in from local governments, which itself requires upfront and long-term engagement. Working with local governments will also have the benefit of encouraging private enterprises to take the concerns of local governments more seriously. Engagement with private enterprises is also important, as they may have creative ways of addressing the plan's goals. Two of the most important initiatives from the 2010 National Broadband Plan—Google Fiber and Comcast Internet Essentials—did not involve federal government action but rather reflected private efforts that advanced public goals. It is also critical to engage with the philanthropic community, as these organizations can fund supportive initiatives that may be outside the scope of federal funding. Nonprofit and community advocates must have a seat at the planning table, representing the very people Congress seeks to serve with broadband funding. Without their involvement, any state plan would likely miss the mark. Improve mapping, data collection, and modeling—and bookmark the funding to pay for itA state will not succeed unless it facilitates intelligent decisionmaking. This requires each state to collect, analyze, and disseminate the relevant information to stakeholders and decisionmakers on a timely basis. This includes data on the end-user structures that require a broadband connection; the type of networks available and performance characteristics; and socioeconomic, demographic, adoption, and usage data. Such mapping should be able to define geographies as served, unserved, or underserved locations. Meanwhile, state data collection should include the information necessary to benchmark goals against other states and determine other key metrics such as the affordability gap for populations in both unserved/underserved and well-served areas. Using these maps and data, states must then create models for decisionmakers to determine how and where to spend federal and state funding. This could involve engineering analysis and cost estimates for deploying broadband infrastructure to targeted areas as well as business models for investing into unserved and underserved areas. This part of the process will be difficult, as states have limited access to the necessary data. One tactic that has already worked in several states is requiring that any entity seeking funding be required to provide their own data to assist in the state planning effort. This is also likely to be the most expensive part of the process. For the 2010 National Broadband Plan, about half of the resources were spent on outside consultants to develop a comprehensive model for the costs of closing the broadband availability gap. Given the expertise required for such models, that will likely be the case this time as well. Develop a comprehensive plan for availability, adoption, and utilizationThe IIJA requires states to develop plans that detail how they will use broadband to improve performance in sectors that increasingly depend on it, such as health care, education, workforce development, public safety, emergency response, and economic development. This means state plans should not only achieve the goal of assuring that all have access to broadband networks, but also that broadband becomes affordable to all, such as through the Affordable Connectivity Program. This does not need to be done all at once, but planning should begin with the understanding that the efforts are not simply about deployment. Further, the stakeholder engagement process described above is vital for creating the kinds of public-private partnerships that states will benefit from in order to more effectively address both adoption and utilization goals. Coordinate state and local action to lower the cost of deploymentOnce a state has its plan, it should establish processes that result in construction cost savings. The idea is similar to the "dig once" concept—coordination in digging up rights of ways and upgrading other infrastructure can significantly reduce construction costs and disruption. Given the many infrastructure projects that could benefit from construction coordination—including roads, water and sewer networks, electric grids, and broadband—states should develop plans that incentivize coordination. They should also incentivize permitting processes that accelerate decisionmaking and reduce costs. Establish a competitive grant processOnce a state has identified where it wishes to deploy new or upgraded broadband networks, it must establish a competitive process for awarding the funding that rewards enterprises that can deliver the most valuable and cost-effective solutions. There are a variety of ways to do this. States could use reverse auctions—a mechanism that awards funds to the provider willing to deploy networks that meet a specified performance standard at the lowest level of subsidy. While this mechanism has merit, unfortunately, the most recent FCC effort that used it erred in the execution, souring Congress and likely many states on using this process. States could also use a more traditional competitive grant process in which points are assigned for certain metrics (network performance, cost of subsidy, speed of delivery, total lifetime of infrastructure, etc.). Whatever the mechanism, the process will be a major point of contention for all potential bidders. As part of the stakeholder engagement process noted above, states should seek input on the metrics for evaluating bids. States need to build in time to consider all their concerns and, to the extent possible, adopt a process that potential bidders will view as fair so that as many participate as possible. Establish a process to enforce commitmentsUnfortunately, a promise made is not a promise kept. When states provide funding for private entities to deploy broadband networks, they must do so under contractual provisions that incentivize the winners to fulfill their commitments. States must take steps to oversee, audit, and verify that those commitments have been met. This is not a unique problem, but it does raise significant complexities that are likely to be similar in many states. With the IIJA's broadband objectives, Congress gave the states a great opportunity as well as great challenge. By taking the steps outlined above, alongside actions by the FCC and NTIA outlined in earlier posts, states can help the nation can get closer to expanding broadband access and affordability to all Americans. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
| Posted: 21 Jan 2022 08:44 AM PST By Tom Wheeler In the sixth century B.C., Greek storyteller Aesop told the tale of a boy tasked with watching his village's sheep herd who sought attention by crying out a false warning that a wolf was threatening the flock. Some have asked whether the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) cried wolf about the use of new 5G wireless spectrum threatening aircraft safety. Supporting that query is confusion about why the FAA dumped this issue on the Biden administration just as the new 5G airwaves were about to be put into service. Just before Halloween 2021, the FAA announced it would be warning airlines about potential interference. Late in December 2021, as the mobile communications companies were about to flip the switch to roll out their 5G service, the FAA filled the news with warnings that the new wireless signals could cause radio altimeters to fail, thus threatening passengers' lives. The wireless companies responded by delaying the launch of the new service. The Biden White House—as the Trump White House apparently did not—immediately stepped in as a referee between the differing positions of the FAA and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). On January 18, the day before the postponed 5G relaunch, President Biden announced an agreement by the wireless companies to further delay deployment of the new spectrum around airports. This Didn't Happen OvernightThe international standard for 5G was released in 2017 and has been continually refined since then. It was first installed in the U.S. in 2019, but not in the disputed airwaves. The new spectrum that is the cause of the FAA's concerns (the so-called C-band) has been under consideration at the FCC for years. In 2018 the FCC formally proposed using C-band for 5G. In March 2020, the FCC published the rules for the use of the spectrum for 5G. Included in those rules was the expansion of a proposal by Boeing designed to prevent the kind of problems about which the FAA worried. The FCC took Boeing's suggestion to create a "guard band" that would keep 5G far away from the altimeters and doubled its size from what Boeing recommended. The resulting buffer was 220 MHz, a sizable amount of spectrum, equivalent to what in other frequencies could hold 36 traditional analog television stations, or almost 150 of the new digital TV signals. Technically, this is an airwave management problem. Such challenges have arisen before when old airwaves were put to new purposes—and the problems were resolved. Politically, this is a government management problem. The FAA was not caught off guard. There was, after all, a lengthy deliberation process at the FCC. This was not a situation where the FAA waited until the last minute—and a new administration—to raise their concerns. As far back as 2018, these issues had been formally raised with the FCC by those affected. Operationally, the FAA's early awareness of the issue begs the question: why the agency did not immediately begin working with the airlines to mitigate the problem of altimeters that had been made without adequate filters for errant radio signals? Legally, the question is why, after the FCC's 2020 decision, the FAA (or one of the airlines) did not go to court to challenge the FCC decision. There is hardly a major decision of the FCC that doesn't end up in court. Typically, the plaintiffs are acting to protect their economic interests. If this was such a safety risk, and the FAA was being ignored, why did not it make that complaint to a court of competent jurisdiction? Governing is About Making DecisionsIt turns out the FAA had escalated these issues to a White House process during the Trump administration. In December 2020, nine months after the FCC's decision and one week before the FCC's auction for use of the airwaves was to begin, the FAA wrote the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), a branch of the Commerce Department, about its concerns. The NTIA is the "President's principal advisor on telecommunications and information policy." As such, it is the official conduit between the White House and those agencies charged with, among other things, spectrum policy. December 2020, of course, was the last full month of the Trump presidency. From the outside, it appears the focus inside the White House during this period was dominated by the president's "Stop the Steal" obsession. The letter "was never passed along to the [FCC] and to wireless companies," The New York Times reported. The job of those elected to govern is to indeed govern. Beyond the turmoil in the White House, the apparent failure of the "President's principal advisor" to engage the White House on this issue is not surprising. The head of NTIA had been fired in May 2019 in a dispute over spectrum. For the last 20 months of the Trump administration four interim leaders rotated through NTIA. The disagreement between the FAA and the FCC was not unusual. Federal agencies often disagree with one another based on how an action could affect their parochial interests. As the head of government, it is the role of the president and his White House advisors to referee among those interests to determine what is the national interest. When it comes to spectrum, differences in positions are traditionally worked out through a national spectrum plan established by the White House, which the Trump administration promised but never delivered. In October 2019 (five months into NTIA being without an Administrator) President Trump ordered NTIA to produce a national spectrum policy within six months. It never happened. The conflicts between the FAA and the FCC should have been resolved by that process—but the process never got off the ground. The failure of the Trump White House to act effectively gave the FAA the opportunity to relitigate the issues involved. Performance vs. PolicyInstead of meaningful spectrum policy management, the Trump administration produced slogans. Airwave policy was all about "The Race to 5G" that the U.S. had to win against China. If 5G is a "race," however, those in power need to know the racecourse and clear the path. Failure to accomplish those basic goals represents a spectacular failure to govern. The Trump FCC also declared the C-band decision one of their major successes. After the FCC reallocated C-band for mobile use, it sold licenses to use the airwaves for $81 billion and declared victory. A Google search turns up a tweet from the Trump administration's FCC Chairman declaring the agency's C-band actions "a success story." When the prior administration's failure to resolve the interagency dispute ended up putting at risk the wireless companies' $81 billion and threatening the economic growth promised by 5G, President Biden and his aides stepped up. "What I've done is pushed as hard as I can to have the 5G folks hold up and abide by what was being requested by the airlines until they could more modernize over the years, so 5G would not interfere," President Biden explained in his January 19 press conference. Like the decision or not, that is leadership. Getting to a SolutionThe temporary solution will keep C-band 5G two miles away from potentially affected airports. This means an estimated 90 percent of the new network can still come online. The good news is that the 5G interference problems can be solved with new or retrofitted aircraft altimeters. The bad news is that fix is going to cost money precisely at the time when commercial airlines are struggling. It should not be overlooked either that the wireless companies will not be receiving the full benefit of what they paid billions for. At some point in time soon, one should expect the airlines to seek recompense. At this point, it appears the smaller regional jets are a locus of concern. That these are small contract companies operating under the livery of the big airlines will only increase the pressure for a third party to foot the bill. There are only three potential parties to look to: the financially struggling airlines, the wireless companies who paid $82 billion for what they were told was usable spectrum, and the federal government who pocketed the spectrum sale proceeds. Beyond who pays is the question of the fix. Interestingly, there are no official standards for radio altimeters. Thus, the FAA has had to make its judgements based on theoretical worst-case models. The FCC engineers, after reviewing a study by the Aerospace Vehicle Institute, concluded, it "does not demonstrate that harmful interference would likely result under reasonable scenarios" or even "reasonably 'foreseeable scenarios." Because there is no altimeter standard, the FCC engineers observed, "there may be a large variation in radio altimeter receiver performance between different manufacturers," and encouraged the aviation industry "to take account of the RF [radio frequency] environment that is evolving." The current difficulties did not have to happen. There are now altimeter standards on the way, but they will not be available until October 2022. In the meantime, the FAA has cleared almost 80 percent of the domestic aircraft fleet for use around C-band. Efforts at standards and altimeter inspections could have begun several years ago when C-band was first scheduled for reallocation for 5G. As for how to pay for the altimeter fixes, the Trump FCC had the solution at hand, but failed to use it. The C-band reallocation also inconvenienced another industry: the satellite licensees that had been using the spectrum. The FCC required those who bought the new licenses to pay the satellite companies to retrofit their systems. Something similar could have easily been designed into the FCC's C-band decision to pay the airlines for their altimeter retrofit. The future of wireless is 5G. It will be important for the continued growth of the economy, new services for consumers, and all kinds of new applications for large and small enterprises. That the much-heralded "Race to 5G" should be held back because of a lack of proper policy coordination by the originators of the "race" slogan is inexcusable. The 5G debacle demonstrates that governing is more than slogans and bromides. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
| Zambia’s success will be Africa’s success Posted: 21 Jan 2022 07:00 AM PST By H.E. Hakainde Hichilema
I mention the passing of Dr. Kaunda because Zambia has strong roots. He was a person who sought to serve ordinary Zambians and, even if some of the policy decisions his party made did not have optimal outcomes, his intention was to place ordinary Zambians at the center of the country's development. Sadly, Zambia has not lived up to its promise. Over the last decade, we have witnessed the erosion of our economy and the corruption of our politics. As a consequence, our debt has risen to unsustainable levels, reducing the country's capacity to invest in productive areas of our economy and its ability to address the gaps in health care, education, and other social services. Our national budget has been overwhelmed by debt servicing, emoluments, and consumption, when there should have been greater room for investment and growth. The scourge of corruption has eroded our much-needed resources including the debt itself, robbing us further of the opportunity for growth. This slide towards debt, disaster, and dependency set our country on a bleak course. Fortunately, the people of Zambia that decided to change direction and the election—notably under difficult COVID-19 conditions—saw a change of government and the opportunity for a new beginning.
It was our third peaceful, democratic transfer of leadership since the advent of multi-party democracy three decades ago. It was an African success. Notably, Zambia's transition is an example of Africa's success in addressing its own challenges: The African Union played an instrumental role in ensuring our smooth transfer of power. This transition also sends a clear message that Africa embraces the right to democratic choice. It comes after the historic stand taken by the courts in our neighbor, Malawi, where a rigged election outcome was rejected, and new elections were successfully held in 2019. In both these cases, it was Africans who held the election, contested it, and adjudicated on its fairness. We can say with pride that Africans own democracy on the continent. The road ahead will not be without challenges but, with a clear vision and plan, and with relentless determination, we will deliver on the aspirations of our people. My administration's focus over the next five years will be on restoring macroeconomic stability and promoting the growth of the economy. We will pay special attention to lowering the fiscal deficit, reducing public debt, and restoring social and market confidence. We will also promote national unity and good governance by strictly adhering to the rule of the law and democratic accountability. Our priority is a simple one: We must find a way to include the jobless youth in our economy. In order to do that, we need to build our economy by encouraging new investment and giving our young people the skills they need to participate fully in the economy. Growing the economy requires agile thinking that uses all the levers at our disposal. We must urgently attend to restoring our mining sector to its rightful place as a leading global producer of copper by ensuring regulatory fairness and attending to obstacles that stand in the way of new investment. We must strive to increase the production of copper and other minerals so that Zambia can reclaim its place as one of Africa's leading mining countries. We need to make Zambia a preferred investment destination by cutting red tape and reducing policy uncertainty which cause investors to hesitate.
We must encourage the growth of new businesses. We need 1,000—perhaps even 10,000—entrepreneurs to bloom, igniting our small business sector as a key employer and source of innovation and growth. To do this, we must make it easier for small businesses to gain access to capital. Government must understand the challenges that entrepreneurs and investors face, and do its part to welcome investment, growth, and innovation. None of this will happen without clean and purposeful governance. The institutions mandated to investigate and prosecute will be given unfettered autonomy to act without fear or favor and without political bias. Malpractice and mismanagement must be rooted out. From the election to economic recovery, Zambia's success will, in this way, be Africa's success. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
| The digital transformation of agriculture in Indonesia Posted: 21 Jan 2022 06:51 AM PST By Lesly Goh Food security is an important goal for Indonesia, and since the introduction of the Food Law of 2012, the country has made good progress in staple food production. However, a World Bank report pointed out that overall food security performance—i.e., the availability, affordability, and (nutritional) quality of food—is mixed. To date, food security policies have aimed at improving availability; going forward, the policy focus should shift to enhancing affordability and nutritional quality. The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted weaknesses of the agri-food system in the country, but it also brings an unprecedented opportunity to transform the system. The traditional agriculture sector in emerging markets is being transformed by digital technologies and can be viewed from the lean startup lens—"think big, act fast, start small". I delved deeper into Indonesia in my chapter in the recent book Breakthrough: The Promise of Frontier Technology for Sustainable Development. "AgriTech" uses digital technology to improve agricultural yields and profitability for smallholder farmers. Emerging markets such as Indonesia are developing a dynamic and vibrant AgriTech ecosystem in five key business models—farmers advisory, peer-to-peer lending, traceability, digital marketplaces, and mechanization. Increased investment in agriculture to modernize food systems and make them more efficient is key to improving the country's food production. This will also enable smallholder farmers to improve productivity and earn more income. Facilitating and Promoting Agriculture Digital Transformation to Drive Food SecurityAgriculture is the least digitized sector in Indonesia, and as a result, productivity gains and development opportunities are left untapped. The digital transformation of agriculture involves the adoption of digital technologies such as mobile/internet connectivity, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), cloud computing, the Internet of Things (IoT), and blockchain/Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to enable new business models that can help improve agricultural yields, efficiency, incomes, and profitability. Moreover, it will require an innovation culture mindset shift to attract a new generation of farmers and entrepreneurs. To operationalize and take full advantage, a "digital agriculture ecosystem" must be developed, which includes:
To develop the digital agriculture ecosystem, three critical factors are needed: data, innovation, and partnerships between multiple stakeholders in the public and private sectors. The agriculture digital transformation will leverage institutional innovation to foster crossfertilization of knowledge and productive partnerships, catalyzing data sharing, and the experimentation and testing of disruptive technologies. It will scale proven solutions through national-level engagements for an efficient, equitable, and environmentally sustainable food system. The digital transformation of the agriculture sector in other emerging markets can provide key lessons that Indonesia can adapt to its local context. Traditional ways of bridging the yield gaps—for example, by applying more fertilizer and pesticides and teaching farmers good agricultural practices—are not sufficient. A transformation in agriculture is needed where data can lead to better, timely, and actionable knowledge. The influence of weather, soil, crop reaction to conditions, and small production plots make it difficult to develop universal solutions. How Indonesia is Digitally Transforming the Agriculture SectorTechnology can be a driver of continuous growth. However, examples of digital agriculture public-private partnerships in Indonesia are still limited. Hence, building strategic partnerships with private businesses, in the form of an "Innovation Hub", can use data to unlock the full potential of technology-enabled transformation in agriculture. There are four key characteristics of an Innovation Hub that would be essential to offer a positive environment for the development and growth of AgriTech startups and encourage the adoption of digital technologies across the agriculture value chain:
Various AgriTech business models have emerged globally to address the main challenges smallholder farmers face. Indonesia is an example of what developing countries can hope to achieve. The AgriTech startups are already making inroads in shaping the agriculture value chain in Indonesia, much in the same way that Fintechs are transforming the financial services sector. Investing in Data and Innovation ecosystems could attract more young innovators in agriculture. Together with enabling regulations and increased investments in infrastructure, digital technologies will be the key enabler to address food security, reduction in food wastage, sustainable farming, and climate crisis. The establishment of the Innovation Hub in Indonesia could bring together multiple stakeholders in the agriculture value chain to share data, foster innovation, provide investment, mentoring, and capacity building for young startups. The hub's success will be dependent on building partnerships between the public and private sector and making sure that regulations can foster innovation while mitigating potential risks. More technological innovation in agriculture is needed today. This is a global challenge and the time to act is now. In the spirit of the lean startup mindset: Let's think big, start small and act fast. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
| 4 paradoxes of global education on International Day of Education Posted: 21 Jan 2022 06:37 AM PST By Brad Olsen On the 4th annual International Day of Education, I find myself awash in some of the thorny paradoxes that mark educational development at the global level. Until halfway through the 20th century, education was mostly a local affair. Although some reformers traveled abroad to find innovative instructional practices (including Horace Mann, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, and the Qing dynasty), in most cases countries managed their own education programs and—within countries—schooling was often decentralized. It wasn't until after World War II, when several western governments erected partnerships to ensure peace and economic stability, that multilateral institutions emerged and began articulating shared human values and administering them through educational efforts. Since then, a global architecture has ascended: one that supports countries to adopt education practices that achieve literacy, career preparedness, democratic goals such as gender equity and human rights, and—more recently—critical and creative thinking, digital competence, and environmental stewardship. This is laudable, yet, like so many things where the traditional clashes with the modern, where local overlaps with global, and where power is unequally apportioned, international education efforts are shaped by inherent tensions. 1. Retaining the local as we embrace the globalContemporary education donors and policymakers like to borrow from each other and learn from successes and mistakes in other countries. There's value in not reinventing the wheel (even though, conversely, some organizations prefer to "do it themselves"). Currently, therefore, a relatively small menu of educational innovations circulates the globe (e.g., education technology, charter schools, online teacher development, afterschool volunteer mentoring, and student-centered instruction). Yet, this homogenization of innovations narrows the scope of what is thinkable and available in education. Does it discourage new or alternative ideas? How does a country capitalize on its unique strengths and characteristics if its education program is dominated by other countries' policy agendas? And which countries' reforms dominate the reform menu—the ones with foreign aid to deliver, or those scoring highest on assessment tables? Identifying what's right for a particular location, looking for new solutions, and at the same time building on the existing knowledge base can appear to be incompatible goals. 2. Harnessing the good of modernization while filtering out the badTo many, modernization is a universal virtue. It's hard for most of us to argue against girls' access to quality education, differentiated instruction, or equal school funding for low-income communities. Public heath, strong economies, representative democracy, technological and medical advancement, and equal rights matter. Yet, some of the aspects that come along for the ride—like remora fish attached to their hosts—give me pause. Is technology really the solution to many of the world's educational problems or does it simply replace one slate of problems with another? Is GDP really the exalted metric, or should education prioritize happiness or environmental responsibility instead? Is it possible to pry modernization away from vexing neoliberal traits like new managerialism in education or an overreliance on standardized testing? 3. Improving institutions when everything is connectedThe popularity of systemic reform in global education is undergirded by a healthy view of the interconnectedness of all things. As a result, we engage in the complexity of whole systems. We promote holistic implementation frameworks, speak of "transformation" rather than "transfer," and strive for collaborative buy-in from broad arrays of stakeholders and sectors.
Yet, harnessing complexity is elusive. For example, improving education cannot be separated from poverty. But alleviating poverty requires addressing hunger, which is connected to food scarcity which is likely linked to climate change. One inevitably finds that the strands that can be controlled (like funding formulas or math curricula) are hitched to strands that cannot (such as budget variances, competing social priorities, or a global pandemic). As a result, we can get dejected by the enormity of it all. 4. Transforming schools while they're still in useSpeaking of COVID-19, the pandemic revealed that education around the world must be structurally transformed, not just cosmetically improved. Nineteenth-century practices like 40 children listening to a single adult standing at the front, recitation and fact-based assessment, or teaching as a low-paid semi-profession all need significantly more than a makeover. If we didn't know that before, we sure do now. Yet, how do you rebuild a plane in the air? We cannot pause education for a generation while we overhaul institutions and retool learning and teaching as contemporary creative human practices. This is why tinkering is the norm and surface changes beat out deep renewal. Furthermore, governance craves political wins—a fact that privileges small projects, cheap fixes, and short-term efforts. But transforming a country's educational ecosystem requires decades of continuity and shared purpose; egoless leadership at all levels; and financial, political, and social commitment. What does it all mean?As I contemplate these rooted tensions, I realize that persevering in education is not about solving the paradoxes but about striving to succeed within them: finding the middle path, making productive use of the benefits of each side while avoiding the pitfalls of each extreme. Acknowledging the plethora of forces pushing against fundamentally improved education systems around the world is key. So is not giving up. And that's where I find hope. We've learned a lot about improving education over recent decades and a ton over the last 24 months. There are many success stories to be found. I believe that holism is the best conceptual approach. Systemic reform is the wisest policy path. And opening deep learning to everyone, tying schools to communities, and equitably prioritizing 21st century knowledge and dispositions are the right educational goals. There are millions of educators, researchers, donors, and government personnel who care deeply and can unite their efforts to thoughtfully combine these dimensions for transformation. For me, International Day of Education is an exhortation to keep pushing. Let us be brave and find strength in our connections to each other. Let's share what's working but balance expertise with curiosity, confidence with humility. I hope that we will share our successes next year on this day. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
| Federal investments ignore crucial upgrades to school facilities—and students pay the price Posted: 21 Jan 2022 06:26 AM PST By Logan Booker, Nicolas Zerbino Throughout the first year of his presidency, Joe Biden has regularly highlighted the need for investing in school infrastructure. From speeches referencing the lack of safe drinking water and ventilation to the pollution produced by school buses, the subject has been consistently present in the administration’s remarks. The American Society of Civil Engineers echoed these concerns in its release of the nation's infrastructure report card earlier this year, grading public school facilities with a D+. This post describes recent developments in the administration's school infrastructure proposals, highlights areas of underinvestment, and summarizes recent research on how some of these failings might impact students. On Nov. 15, 2021, President Biden signed the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act into law, with total investments of $1.2 trillion over 10 years (including $550 billion in new spending). The package covers $284 billion in new funds directed toward transportation needs, such as roads, bridges, public transport, railroads, and electric vehicles. The remaining $266 billion in new investments focus on core infrastructure—ranging from improving the power grid, broadband access, and water systems to environmental resiliency and remediation. But there is one notable category that is missing in the newly minted infrastructure legislation: schools. In early versions of Biden's infrastructure plan, the White House outlined a $100 billion investment for "school construction and modernization." In September 2021, the proposed investment slipped to $82 billion; by late October, all language referencing school investment was removed from the plan. This left many educators, families, and advocates who were previously hopeful about the potential investment disappointed—especially those suffering from the consequences of failing and dangerous school infrastructure. Reviewing the lack of infrastructure investmentMaintenance on existing school buildings is inadequate in many communities nationwide. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that 53% of school districts said that they need to replace multiple building systems (HVAC, electric, plumbing, gas piping, fire protection, etc.), while 16% of districts have not assessed their building needs in more than 10 years. According to the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, the most recent comprehensive estimate by the Department of Education, from 2014, found that $197 billion would be needed to improve school facilities to a level considered "good." Dwindling school spending since the Great Recession implies that number might be an underestimate. More recent estimates indicate that $85 billion per year is needed to maintain "good stewardship" of our nation's schools. The 21st Century School Fund calculated that districts fund 81% of their capital expenditures with local moneys, with states covering the remaining 19%. This raises obvious equity concerns. Districts and states with higher concentrations of low-income communities may struggle to levy funds for long-term investments, resulting in stocks of poorly maintained facilities and few resources for new ones. Kenneth Shores, Hojung Lee, and Nell Williams examined the sources driving funding inequities (overall, not just infrastructure related), and they concluded that the major gaps in per-pupil spending arise across states, though inequities within states and districts also exist. The previously cited GAO report points out that high-poverty districts spent $300 (30%) less per student than their more affluent counterparts on expenditures for capital construction. This piles more difficulties onto the already full plate of challenges that high-need districts face. It is important to acknowledge that approximately $190 billion in funds have been made available for districts and states through 2020 and 2021 from Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) funding to stabilize school spending in the face of the pandemic. But many of these funds are directed to critical pandemic-induced challenges, such as learning loss and protective equipment. Though the Department of Education allows the use of ESSER funds for some infrastructure investments (such as HVAC systems), potentially billions of dollars in school capital needs are left unaddressed. Why the condition of school facilities matters for studentsA growing body of research indicates that underinvestment in school infrastructure negatively impacts not only the health of K-12 students but also their educational outcomes. For example, researchers analyzed data from a district in Texas and found that students attending schools in disrepair or with understaffed maintenance teams had lower levels of attendance and higher dropout rates. Claudia Persico has shown in successive studies that poor air quality, antiquated HVAC systems, and geographic proximity to Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) sites can negatively impact the safety of schoolchildren. The findings highlight that the physical location of schools and the consequent exposure of students to pollutants also negatively impact student test scores and increase absences and suspensions. Meanwhile, other research suggests that improving filtration systems can decrease the risk of illness and potentially increase student achievement. Not all improvements to school facilities must necessarily be costly investments. Thousands of schoolchildren ride in diesel-fueled buses to and from school, which are not only ecologically harmful but cause direct health and academic harm to students. This situation can be mitigated by modifying school bus engines with cheap filters to curtail pollutants. An investigation into the impact of these adaptations significantly improved the academic performance of students. Just as poor infrastructure negatively impacts students, facilities in good condition can promote an adequate learning environment. Researchers studied the effects of new infrastructure on educational achievement in Los Angeles, concluding that spending four years in a new school building is associated with increased math and English test scores. A study from Michigan examined bond referenda and found positive long-run effects of investments in school infrastructure on student reading proficiency levels. Researchers from the Harvard School of Public Health recently reviewed this literature, writing: "There is overwhelming evidence for researchers, legislators, designers, parents, teachers, school districts, and community members to make compelling, fact-based arguments for elevating the role of the school building in the national conversation on education." America's public investment in school infrastructure is lagging, and harming students as a result—especially in historically underserved areas. With schools overlooked in the recent infrastructure package and negotiations surrounding Biden's Build Back Better plan stalled, it may be on local and state leaders—along with other stakeholders—to address these needs. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
| Join the conversation on the top priorities for Africa in 2022 Posted: 20 Jan 2022 03:20 PM PST By Aloysius Uche Ordu Today, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) launches its annual flagship report, Foresight Africa. Two years in, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to dominate every narrative regarding the global economy. The future of trade, migration, travel, supply chains, economic growth, education, innovation, etc.—in Africa and elsewhere—remain constrained by the uneven recovery from this virus. Returning to "normal" will require a truly global effort to reduce and mitigate the devastation COVID-19 has had and is continuing to have on the human and financial health of countries. Instead, we have witnessed the emergence of a parallel but diverging world: The rich and vaccinated and the poor and unvaccinated. Africa remains among the latter: As of this writing, of its 1.3 billion people, less than 11 percent of Africans have been fully vaccinated. Moreover, the region is being left even further behind during the global economic recovery. This divergence in vaccination rates, the intensification of fiscal pressures, increased debt levels, and uneven economic recovery were major themes for the continent in 2021. These themes compound the complex challenges the region was already facing, including burgeoning youth unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, and the ravages of climate change. While the pandemic forced leaders to recognize that the best way to address these problems is to promote healthy economic growth, we are in danger of falling back to insufficient or even ineffective development strategies and returning to the status quo. Despite these obstacles, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic about Africa's future. While the region's traditional powerhouses—e.g., Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa as well as Ethiopia—will continue to struggle in the year ahead, the International Monetary Fund forecasts strong growth for sub-Saharan Africa overall—in fact, 3.8 percent for 2022. Notably, medium-sized economies such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo will take up the slack with growth rates above 6 percent as high commodity prices and government reforms improve finances. Smaller countries such as the Seychelles, Rwanda, Mauritius, and Niger will also reach record-high growth rates in 2022 . Moreover, we are only just beginning to see the fruits of the now-operational African Continental Free Trade Area as well as the region's entrepreneurial and technology-savvy growing youth population. Thus, I open this year's Foresight Africa with a hopeful message given Africa's proven ability to weather much of the pandemic with innovation and resilience. The Africa Growth Initiative team and I look forward to the modern, dynamic, and rising Africa captured on this year's cover. Moreover, we hope that our approach to and innovations within the 2022 edition of Foresight Africa—including brand new themes and a more diverse and representative collection of contributors—reflects the dynamism and optimism of the region more broadly. In another change, instead of presenting the theme of good governance as a separate section, this year, each thematic chapter features a "good governance" viewpoint, underpinning the vital role of good governance in achieving Africa's economic and political transformation. With this and every edition of Foresight Africa, we aim to capture the top priorities for the region in the coming year, offering recommendations for African and global stakeholders for creating and supporting a strong, sustainable, and successful Africa. In doing so, we hope that Foresight Africa 2022 will promote an engaging and thoughtful dialogue on the key issues influencing development policy and practice in Africa during the upcoming year. We hope that this will ultimately lead to sound policies and strategies that sustain and expand the benefits of economic growth to all people of Africa. We hope you will engage with us by commenting on our Foresight Africa papers, blog posts, podcasts, and graphics, and by sharing your thoughts on the top priorities this year. We also encourage you to vote for what you think should be the top priority for Africa in the year ahead. You can use #ForesightAfrica to follow the debate or send your thoughts to @BrookingsGlobal to join the conversation on Twitter. You can also leave comments on our related blog posts We hope you can join us for our launch event on Wednesday, January 26. We will follow up on these discussions and post additional contributions from other experts on AGI's Africa in Focus blog throughout the year. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
| How Middle Eastern conflicts are playing out on social media Posted: 20 Jan 2022 03:00 PM PST By Daniel L. Byman The Middle East has always been rife with enmity and rivalry, and its regimes have long taken advantage of the region's many linguistic, religious, and cultural connections to shape the overall political environment. Regimes that do not control the information space risk being destroyed by it. The Middle East is far from alone. Virtually every authoritarian regime barrages its own population with propaganda, ranging from state-controlled television to social media campaigns on a wide range of platforms. The Middle East, however, may be especially prone to foreign influence operations. In addition to intense regional rivalries, the lack of free media in many countries and the distrust of government and institutions make the region particularly vulnerable. This tendency is reinforced by actual conspiracies, including the 1953 coup that toppled Mossadegh, the false pretext of the Suez Crisis, and myriad attempts by regional governments to weaken and overthrow one another. In addition, shared religious, historical, and linguistic ties, embodied in concepts such as pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, both create transnational bonds and foster vulnerabilities. It is easy for ideas to cross borders, and in so doing they can inspire, frighten, or subvert. Social media campaigns are now a regular tool of Middle Eastern governments, and they are used as well by governments like Russia seeking to influence the Middle East. The confrontation between Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the so-called "Quartet") and Qatar, for example, began in 2017 in part due to social media exploitation involving hacked email accounts and associated disinformation. It escalated into a massive social media skirmish between the two sides around the broader Muslim world that endures to this day. This campaign later encompassed an effort to discredit Qatar's ally, Turkey, and included actors in the civil wars in Libya and Yemen, as well. Iran, for its part, created a network of fake websites and online personas, an operation that The Citizen Lab labeled "Endless Mayfly," to spread false information about Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. On a more individual level, Saudi Arabia targeted dissidents such as Jamal Khashoggi, trying to make his online life a living hell — "the equivalent of sustained gunfire online," as one of his friends put it. Why social media is so useful for Middle Eastern governmentsSocial media offers governments several advantages in their information operations. Perhaps most important, social media campaigns are relatively cheap and have low barriers to entry. As so many Middle Easterners use social media, manipulating these platforms is an inexpensive way for regimes to influence large audiences. What's more, social media companies' guardrails are weaker outside an English-language environment, as they may focus more on profitability and innovation before security and information quality. Volume also matters. Rumors and conspiracies are more likely to be believed if people are repeatedly exposed to them, and the constant pushing of conspiracies on multiple platforms can make the outlandish seem believable. Social media campaigns also grant a degree of deniability. Some states clandestinely fund private firms, encourage their citizens to act on their own, or simply tolerate activities such as hacking and harassment, making it hard to find a smoking gun that ties the government to a specific action. Social media sources are often more trusted than traditional media. Family and friends pass on news and other information via Facebook and other platforms, implicitly endorsing it, and they are more trusted sources than the media and government. When governments can tap into these personal networks, their messages are far more likely to be believed and supported. Finally, social media also offers an excellent mix of differentiation and reach. Huge platforms like Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram are great ways to reach elite Saudis focused on politics as well as more ordinary Saudis who might use these platforms for sports, work, and entertainment. At the same time, through microtargeting the regimes can focus more specialized messages on different constituencies, again at relatively low cost. Political microtargeting is under-regulated, especially for non-English-speaking users. How disinformation campaigns play out on Middle Eastern social mediaThese campaigns and the states behind them use a number of tools to increase the influence of their social media efforts. These include creating fake news sites, modifying the content of legitimate sites, creating fake personas who masquerade as journalists or opposition figures, "typosquatting" by taking advantage of common mistakes (such as "thejerusalempost[dot]org" (the real site is "jpost.com"), and many other methods. In addition, they may simply create a virtual loudspeaker, using bots and human armies to retweet, "like," and drown out critics, while boosting pro-regime content. At times they have directed their troll armies at internal critics, such as the late Khashoggi or critics of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. Such constant harassment makes online life miserable for these individuals, wearing them down through constant abuse. It also deters ordinary people from following them, as they seek to avoid the cesspool of recrimination and abuse associated with the critics' accounts. Another method is to hack or otherwise gain access to a rival's private information and then selectively publicize it. In June 2017, days before a public and enduring split between Qatar and the Quartet began, a group called "GlobalLeaks" sent out copies of emails and other hacked documents of the UAE ambassador to the United States to various U.S. media outlets. At times, the goal (or at least the outcome) is that citizens do not know what to believe and so dismiss all news sources or otherwise lose faith in traditional institutions. Facebook notes that some actors "engaged in what we call 'perception hacking.' That is, rather than running actual on-platform campaigns or compromising election systems, they are attempting to garner influence by fostering the perception that they are everywhere, playing on people's far of widespread deception itself." Making all this worse, a host of authentic accounts from political leaders, clerics, and others spread hateful or false ideas, often with little interference from social media companies despite the violation of their terms of service. The capabilities and means of state actors to spread disinformation vary considerably. Many employ outside firms to run at least part of their effort. Saudi Arabia created a "troll farm," identifying messages to amplify and paying workers to identify voices on Twitter that need to be silenced. Workers at the farm received daily lists of people to threaten and insult, pro-government messages to augment, and other instructions. What is the impact of these disinformation campaigns?Judging the impact of these campaigns is difficult. The Quartet was determined to escalate pressure on Qatar, and the social media campaign was the result, not the cause, of this standoff. Although Iran was able to get its propaganda published and retweeted — The Citizen Lab estimates that Iran generated 21,685 clicks on its Endless Mayfly content — how much it changed minds, and who those minds were, is not clear. Fortunately, Middle Eastern regimes are not at the level of Russia when it comes to disinformation. Iran, with its anti-American propaganda, often is "hasty in execution" when it comes to operations, according to disinformation expert Clint Watts. And while Saudi Arabia did indeed make Khashoggi's online life a living hell, this did not deter him, leading the regime to turn to the more time-honored tactic of assassination. Researchers Jennifer Pan and Alexandra Siegel found that the Saudi regime's imprisonment of dissenters and other repression did deter critics, but it also led to an increase in attention to their cause and more online dissent from their followers. How to push back against online disinformationDemocratic governments, social media companies, and civil society organizations all can help combat these campaigns. Much of the relevant technical expertise and knowledge of ongoing operations are in the private sector, and governments must be able to draw on and coordinate with experts there. The United States and other democratic governments must improve their technical capacity and, with it, their ability to detect these campaigns. Social media companies, for their parts, must improve their ability to protect the accounts and user experiences of dissidents, particularly those not operating in an English-language environment, as well as ordinary users who might be fooled by false information. These companies must increase the people and resources they devote to the region to combat false information and actors who violate their terms of service. They must also be more open with data so independent researchers can better monitor potentially dangerous activity. This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
| Japan-Taiwan relations: A look back on 2021 and look ahead to 2022 Posted: 20 Jan 2022 01:47 PM PST By Adam P. Liff, Ryan Hass Throughout 2021, U.S. government officials and scholars expressed deepening concerns that China may use its growing military power to force unification with Taiwan. Against this backdrop, Japan-Taiwan relations and Japan's role in cross-Strait peace and stability — as a close neighbor whose westernmost territory is less than 70 miles from Taiwan, fellow democracy, and U.S. treaty ally hosting roughly 50,000 U.S. military personnel — attracted unprecedented media and policy attention. In a written conversation with Brookings Senior Fellow and Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies Ryan Hass, Adam P. Liff, an associate professor of East Asian international relations at Indiana University's Hamilton Lugar School and nonresident senior fellow in Brookings' Foreign Policy program, reflects on the past year of Japan-Taiwan relations and looks ahead to the rest of 2022.
RYAN HASS:
ADAM P. LIFF: The first development I'd highlight relates to the remarkable "mainstreaming" in Japan of concerns about peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, especially after the April summit between President Joe Biden and then-Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. It wasn't that Japanese concerns were fundamentally new, especially among Japanese security experts and prominent "Taiwan-friendly" politicians. In fact, since 1972 Japan's official position calls for "peaceful resolution" of cross-Strait issues through dialogue. And in 2005 — during an earlier period of severe cross-Strait frictions — the U.S. and Japanese governments jointly labeled "peaceful resolution" a "common strategic objective." That said, worsening frictions across the Taiwan Strait throughout 2021 did focus Japanese media, politicians, and policymakers on the risks and potential impact on Japan of a possible conflict — perhaps to an unprecedented degree. Beyond security issues, 2021 also saw Japan's government again express support for democratic Taiwan as "an extremely crucial partner and an important friend, with which [Japan] shares fundamental values," and its application for membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and observer status at the World Health Assembly. Japan's government also continued its formal membership in the U.S. and Taiwan-led Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF). None of these represented a new Japanese position or policy, per se, but especially given Beijing's active efforts to weaken Taiwan's international connections, this support was still meaningful. The last development from 2021 I'd highlight is the continued deepening of politician-centered initiatives. (Since Japan-Taiwan diplomatic relations ended in 1972, legislative exchanges have been the primary venue for political exchange and cooperation.) For example, last February, Japan's most powerful political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), launched its first-ever Taiwan-focused "Project Team." Over the summer, it delivered policy recommendations to Japan's prime minister and helped facilitate inter-legislator dialogues, including a virtual meeting pairing LDP politicians with counterparts from Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to discuss security issues. Japanese politicians' quiet coordination with U.S. counterparts also ultimately led to the allies donating a combined eight million COVID-19 vaccines to Taiwan. So, it was a big year. But context is also key: the incremental deepening of Japan-Taiwan ties is a longer-term trend that significantly predates 2021. And it's critical to differentiate between that more general trend and the specific matter of how Japan might respond in a possible cross-Strait conflict.
RYAN HASS:
ADAM P. LIFF: Perhaps the most high-profile and consequential example was a global headline-making July 5 remark from Japan's then-deputy prime minister, Taro Aso. I can't go into a full post-mortem but suffice it to say that much reporting and commentary left out critical context and/or misrepresented what Aso actually said: For starters, Aso's remark was made at an LDP political party fundraiser in a Tokyo hotel, not in Japan's parliament, as some claimed. This suggests that the famously outspoken Aso appeared to be speaking as an LDP politician, not a government representative. Second, what Aso actually said appears to have been widely misunderstood or exaggerated, at least sometimes due to poor or incomplete translations. What he appeared to present as a conditional possibility ("could") — namely, if an attack on Taiwan occurred and Japan's political leaders judged that it posed an "existential threat" to Japan — was widely misrepresented as an unconditional commitment ("would"). Unfortunately, this comment was widely cited as alleged evidence that Japan's government had somehow radically departed from its decades-old posture and publicly committed to defending Taiwan alongside the U.S. It did not. To be sure, the content and rarity of such a remark certainly made it newsworthy and notable. But that fact, too, counseled additional caution. Also problematic: unambiguously authoritative evidence of the government's nuanced official position did not receive nearly as much attention as a few attention-grabbing remarks like Aso's. Yet throughout 2021, top Cabinet officials, including the prime minister and chief Cabinet secretary, repeatedly reaffirmed the basic ambiguity at the heart of Japan's decades-old posture: Japan wishes to see a peaceful resolution through direct dialogue between Beijing and Taipei, and does not pre-commit to any particular course of action if war breaks out. To sum up: in 2021, did Japan's government publicly pledge to "defend Taiwan," or to back the United States if China attacks Taiwan? No. Did it say it won't back the United States if China attacks Taiwan and the U.S. decides to intervene? Also no. Rather, Japan's government repeatedly signaled that whether and how Japan would respond, and under what legal authorities it might consider deploying its Self-Defense Forces, will depend on political leaders' judgment about the particulars of the contingency. Japan's reluctance to publicly go beyond this ambiguous posture should not be interpreted as apathy, or ambivalence. Nor should it be surprising — after all, even the U.S.' famously forward-leaning posture is "strategically ambiguous," and certainly not unconditional. But it's important to get the nuances of Japan's official position right. This is not some academic distinction. Going forward, accurately assessing where Japan's government stands on these issues is critically important for policymakers to make sound judgments. The stakes are extremely high. Careful parsing of what was actually said, who said it, and in what capacity, is essential.
RYAN HASS:
ADAM P. LIFF: To what extent will the U.S. and Japan deepen cooperation with third parties in support of Taiwan? For example, might another U.S. democratic ally or India follow Japan (2019) and Australia (2021) and formally join GCTF or otherwise deepen its cooperation to support Taiwan's international engagement? Or as Australia-Japan security ties deepen and Australia's leaders become increasingly vocal expressing concerns about Taiwan, is deeper trilateral coordination in the cards? Will Japan agree to more explicit statements of support for Taiwan in a U.S.-Japan bilateral statement? Though in recent years Japan's government officially identifies Taiwan as an "an extremely crucial partner and an important friend," in a U.S.-Japan alliance joint statement it has resisted explicitly referring to "Taiwan" (as opposed to relatively anodyne statements about "peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait") or criticizing Beijing's attempted intimidation of Taipei. The January 2022 2+2 statement's reiteration of last year's language suggests this may not change anytime soon. What, if any, public evidence is there of deepening Japan-Taiwan(-U.S.) security cooperation, or U.S.-Japan alliance planning for a Taiwan contingency? Throughout 2021, Japanese security experts and "Taiwan-friendly" politicians expressed concerns about the lack of Japan-Taiwan security cooperation and/or U.S.-Japan contingency planning specifically for a cross-Strait contingency. Though a few media reports suggest some forward movement on the latter, it is tough to draw clear conclusions from the public record. Meanwhile, some voices on both sides continue to bemoan the continued obstacles to Japan-Taiwan security cooperation. Finally, will efforts by Tokyo and Beijing to commemorate the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic normalization negatively affect prospects for Japan-Taiwan cooperation this year? Despite significant frictions in the East China Sea and elsewhere, China remains a hugely important country for Japan, and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has called for a "stable relationship." How will Tokyo and Beijing mark the anniversary? Will there be any breakthroughs? This posting includes an audio/video/photo media file: Download Now |
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